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The key question
Given the size of the epidemic and its location in 
densely populated localities and frequent care in 
the community or in community Ebola treatment 
centres…
• What is the possibility that the disease 
could spread through non-typical routes 
especially disposal of human body 
waste?
Questions for systematic review:
• What are the risk factors for Ebola disease 
transmission in the community?
• How much virus is in faeces, urine, other body fluids?
• How long does Ebola survive in sewage?
Question for Hazard Control Analysis of Critical Points?
• What are the handling and treatment requirements 
of faeces and urine during an EVD outbreak?
Systematic reviews
• Searched 23 July 2015, no language or date limits
• Search terms (in title, abstract or key words)
– Ebola, ebolavirus, filovirus or Marburg-virus
• Databases
– Medline, Scopus, long list of Grey literature
• Duplicate screening and full text review, standard data 
extraction forms
• 5 validity questions for each syst-review: 
– Eg Test method to verify disease cause, or gap from illness to 
interview about risk factors < 3 months
• Numerical pooling of data where possible
– Meta-analysis, combined risk factors, etc.
Systematic review results, July 2015
• Initial review after exclusion of most 
duplicates
– 5114 scientific papers, 1905 articles grey literature
• After duplicate screening title and abstract
– 135 papers eligible for full text review, possible 
info relevant to at least one of our research 
questions
RISK FACTORS FOR 
PERSON-TO-PERSON TRANSMISSION
31 reports on 29 patient groups had relevant data (pub 1978-2014), but 
risk ratios available in only eight reports (outbreaks in 1976-2008)
Numeric Odds, Risk or Prevalence Ratios for Filovirus Disease Acquisition 
demographic attributes
Numeric Odds, Risk or Prevalence Ratios for Filovirus Disease Acquisition 
casual contact with (not touching) living cases
Numeric Odds, Risk or Prevalence Ratios for Filovirus Disease Acquisition 
direct contact with (touching) living cases
Numeric Odds, Risk or Prevalence Ratios for Filovirus Disease Acquisition 
activities associated with cadavers or funerals
The good news – attack rates without direct 
contact (household members)
The good news – attack rates with direct contact 
(household members)
VIRAL LOAD STUDIES IN HUMAN 
BODY FLUIDS
33 reports had eligible data in systematic review 
(1976-2015)
Viral load in blood on days after onset 
of illness (data before 2014)
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Proportion of body fluids positive for 
filovirus by PCR early samples (<17d)
Proportion of body fluids positive for filovirus by 
PCR late samples (day 17-110)
Proportion of body fluids positive for filovirus by 
pooled PCR until day 110 (No. patients) 
Proportion of body fluids positive for 
filovirus by Culture Only, thru day 110
SURVIVAL IN FAECES, STOOL, 
SEWAGE?
Until mid 2015 there were no data, so 
had to go on other facts we knew, 
like….
• Ebola virus is an enveloped virus
• Apparently not adapted to faecal transmission
• Community latrines are the main type of 
transmission site
Time for one log decline
Virus Temp Substrate T90 %
TGEV/MHVC 25
Settled (water) 
sewage 10.5d
TGEV/MHVC 25 Stool 4.7d 45%
Sars CoVL RT
Viral Transport 
Medium 42.0h
Sars CoVL RT Stool 2.7h 6%
Sars CoVL RT
Diarrhoeal 
stool 24.0h 57%
C = Casanova et al 2009. Survival of surrogate coronaviruses in water. Water Res. 43(7): 893-8 
L = Lai et al 2005, Survival of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Clin Inf Dis
Time for one log decline
Virus Temp Substrate T90
Impact of 
stool (% adj.)
Ebola 20 Viral media 9.6d
TGEV/MHV 25 Watery sewage 10.5d
TGEV/MHV 25 Stool 4.7d 45%
SARS CoV RT Viral medium 42.0h
SARS CoV RT Stool 2.7h 6%
SARS CoV RT
Diarrhoeal 
stool 24.0h 57%
Inactivation of  Aujeszky's disease virus in pig slurry, die-off at 
28o about 80 hrs, 4x faster than at 20o (336 hrs)
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So for Ebola virus in pit latrines
Medium Most likely 
T90
Upper 
estimate
T90
T90 at 20⁰C Tissue 
culture
9.6d
T90 at 20⁰C Stool 23h (10%) 4.8d (50%)
T90 in pit latrine at 
28⁰C
Pit latrine 6h (25%) 29h (25%)
Recent research
Bibby et al 2015
• Spiked sterilised and diluted 
mixed origin sewage with 
Ebola virus (Makona, triplicate 
expt)
• Observed 90% decline (T90) 
after 2.1 days 
• Concluded that 2.1 days was 
upper bound for T90 in field, 
due to exptl. conditions
• LoD = 0.75 log10, still detected 
until day 8
T90
Recent research
Casanova & Weaver 2015
• Spiked pasteurised urban 
sewage with phage surrogate 
for Ebola virus, held at 22o or 
30o C
• T90 reached at 1 day (30o) to 
4.5 days (22o)
• 7 log10 inactivation after 3 days 
at 30o, and 5.22 log10 decay 
after ~ 6 days (22o)
• Limit of detection reached at 4 
days (30o) or 10 days (22o)
T90
Sewage/Faecal transmission
• Risk close to patient probably moderate
– Handling faeces
– Faecal smearing of environment/latrines
• Risk distant to patient probably low to very 
low
– Dilution
– Probable rapid decay in faeces at ambient 
temperatures
– Risk to drinking water likely to be low -
Risk Environment Type of risk, 
associated with…
… Blood-
contaminated 
materials
…Other body 
fluid 
contamination
Recommendations
1. Latrine use Contamination of 
environment
High Medium Suspected and confirmed cases use isolated and segregated latrines and 
keep secure for 7 days1,2 after last use by suspected case. Secure from 
surface water inflow via external channels or concrete surroundings, and 
ensure adequate quality of construction to limit risk of collapse and 
contamination of groundwater sources3.
First, clean surfaces using a single-use cloth with water and detergent 
which should then be incinerated. Following cleaning, wipe 0.5% chlorine 
solution2,4-7 on all surfaces, including door handles, toilet seat, floor, 
walls7.
Wash hands with soap and water after using latrine.
6. Emptying of 
latrine 
Contamination of 
handler 
Variable Variable (age of 
waste, latrine 
construction)
Wait a minimum of seven days after last use by a known case before 
desludging6,10. 
If not possible to wait seven days, wear full PPE*11-13.
12. Discharge and 
treatment of 
wastewater through 
sewer
Contact with virus 
by general public 
through open 
sewers, or with 
workers at 
treatment plant
Low Low Public health education of community representatives and construction of 
physical barriers15.  Ensure appropriate conditions of carriage (in many 
places effluent streams are used by neighbours)3 by following sanitation 
safety planning guidelines3,16.
Table 1. Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Point (HACCP) assessment for the 
disposal of waste potentially contaminated with Ebola Virus Disease viral material.
Edmunds et al (under review) WHO Bulletin.
On the balance of evidence
• Risk of widespread rapid transmission via indirect 
casual contact in communities is very low
– Requires close person contact to spread the infection 
• Risk from contact with sewage is very low
– With the possible exception when very close to the 
patient
– Disinfection of faeces may be pointless 
• Risk of transmission through drinking water is low
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